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Perhaps an appropriate subtitle for this paper would be "Some Spec- 
ulations on the Interrelations of Psychological Methodologies." The Scale 
Grid is a name I have given to a model which presumes to define the under- 
lying continuities between such diverse areas as psychophysics, objective 
testing, at t i tude studies including questionnaire and interview techniques, 
learning experiments, rating scale methods, essay examinations, and pro- 
jective instruments. The intent of the Scale Grid is to make explicit the 
fundamental  similarities and differences of the methodologies among these 
various areas of psychological research. The increasing abundance of models 
and methods in all of these areas, with their associated nomenclature and 
specialized vocabularies, makes a unification of them increasingly desirable. 
In some of these areas of psychological research, serious and intensive 
efforts have been made to construct models on a genotypic level to explain 
and predict manifest behavior. One thinks here, for example, of the area of 
signal detection in psychophysics and of objective test performance. In 
other areas the models are less explicit and tend to be on a li terary level. 
However, even in these latter areas one may look at  the methods of analy- 
zing data. Because there is always a model, at  least implied, some of the ele- 
ments of the models are evident. One may look at  this universe of models, 
explicit and implicit, abstract  certain universal elements, and t ry  to charac- 
terize them. 
Our starting point will be to determine the primitive datum in psychol- 
ogy. What  we want is an abstract  definition which will hold for every type 
of psychological observation. Let  us begin by  taking some examples, seeing 
what  the basic abstract  datum is in each case, and then formulating a gen- 
eral definition. In some psychophysical experiments, for example, indi- 
viduals judge which one of several stimuli is the greatest. In view of what 
the experimenter subsequently does with the data, it is evident tha t  he 
thinks of each stimulus as a point; the judgment of the individual is inter- 
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preted as an order relation on these points. Over many  replications, the 
model m a y  deal with a distribution of points for each stimulus and be a 
probabil i ty or actuarial  model, but  this is not the type  of distinction which 
is a t  all impor tan t  to us now. Whether  the models are deterministic or actu- 
arial is not relevant  to the fundamental  distinctions between methodolo- 
gies I want  to make. In  fact, I want  only to make the point now tha t  in 
some types of experiments the manifest behavior is interpreted as an order 
relation between a pair of points, both of which are identified with stimuli. 
A different case arises, however, when an individual takes a mental  
test  and passes some items and fails others. The  use to which the behavior  
is put  also suggests tha t  i t  is being interpreted as a relation on a pair of 
points, but  here one point is identified with an i tem and the other point  
with the individual. The point associated with the individual represents a 
measure of his ability; the point associated with the i tem represents its 
difficulty. The behavior of the individual in passing or failing the i tem is 
interpreted as an order relation on this pair of points. I am not here con- 
cerned with the numerical scores on a test  or even how a theory arrives at  
such a score from the basic datum. These are differences on a higher level, 
and I am here concerned only with differences on most  the primit ive quanti-  
ta t ive  level. 
When an individual is given an a t t i tude  scale and asked to indicate 
which items he will indorse, again the behavior is interpreted as a relation 
on a pair of po in ts - -one  a stimulus, the other an individual. Here the rela- 
tion is on a psychological distance between the point associated with an 
individual and the point associated with the stimulus. I f  the point asso- 
ciated with the stimulus is "near ,"  in a sense defined by  the model, the 
point associated with the individual, he indorses the item, otherwise not. 
So the behavior  is interpreted as indicating whether  the distance between 
two points is greater  or tess than  a certain amount .  
When an individual is asked to place a stimulus on rating scale, again 
the behavior is interpreted as a distance between the point associated with 
the stimulus and a point associated with a response category which is just  
another  stimulus. Consider, for example, an individual who is asked to rate 
a stimulus, say a picture, as to whether it is superior, good, or poor. The 
picture is conceived of as being a point on the scale for this individual; the 
three points on the rat ing scale, superior, good, and poor, are also three 
st imulus points. F rom the lat ter  points the individual selects the one nearest  
the point corresponding to the picture. So we see tha t  rat ing scale behavior  
is interpreted as a relation between points. The same analysis holds if the 
rat ing scale is an ordered set of numbers or the real line. In  fact  counting 
is also rating scale behavior. I f  we ask an individual how many  s tudents  
there are in a class it does not mat te r  whether he guesses or counts as far 
as the basic da tum is concerned. The response, e.g., "35," is interpreted as 
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a relation between one stimulus, the size of the class as perceived, and another 
stimulus, a real number. 
When an individual is asked whether he observed a light increment or 
not, the behavior is interpreted as a relation between a point identified with 
the individual, a threshold, and a point identified with the stimulus, the 
magnitude of the increment. For  a final example, consider an individual 
asked to judge which of two pairs of stimuli is more similar. Here the be- 
havior is usually interpreted as a relation between two distances; if each 
distance is interpreted as a point, then behavior implies a relation on a 
pair of points. 
All of these examples illustrate one important  fact: behavior is made 
into data by interpreting it  as an order relation between points or a relation 
on distances--both may more generally be regarded as a relation on a pair 
of points. An important  distinction must be drawn between behavior and 
data. A datum is defined in this paper as a relation between points. That  
this is not a new idea is evident from a half-page note by  Madison Bentley 
(1) in which he speaks of Stumpf, Wundt, Ebinghaus, Math,  G. E. Mtiller, 
and others who took the view that  psychological measurement is a distance 
measurement, which is just, a special case of a relation between pairs. 
We have been speaking here as if there were just a single distinction 
between behavior and data. Actually a threefold distinction should properly 
be made. We may use the term behavior to refer to anything observable 
about  the individual, raw data to refer to tha t  which is selected for analysis, 
and data to refer to the interpretation of the raw data as an abstract relation 
between points. The first step in going from behavior to raw data, deciding 
what  to observe, is a many-faceted problem which lies outside the scope of 
this paper. We are here concerned exclusively with the raw data and how it 
is interpreted as data in the sense defined above. I shall pursue this dis- 
t inetion between the raw data and the data, illustrating it in detail shortly. 
In principle one could put  any data in a matrix as follows: If the data 
were a relation on a pair of stimuli then a square matrix with rows and 
corresponding columns identified with stimuli (el. Figure 1) could nicely 
accommodate the data. Each cell would contain an e n t w  indicating the rela- 
tion between tha t  corresponding pair of stimuli. Another experiment, where 
one member of the pair of points was identified with an individual and 
the other with a stimulus would require that  the matrix of Figure 1 be 
.expanded as in Figure 2. Thus an experiment in which one point of a pair 
of points was identified as a stimulus and the other as an individual would 
be entered in the left portion; another experiment in which the behavior 
was interpreted as a relation on a pair of points, both of which were identi- 
fied as stimuli, would be entered in the right portion. 
Now if we go a little further and consider an experiment where the 
members of the pair of points are both identified with individuals, the 
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matrix of Figure 2 becomes as in Figure 3. According to this figure, the 
behavior observed in some experiments is interpreted as a relation on pairs 
of points in which both points may be identified with stimuli, both points 
may  be identified with individuals, or one point with a stimulus and one 
point with an individual. When the data  are relatidns between stimulus 
Stimulus Individual Stimulus 
FIGURE I FIGURE 2 
A Data Matrix A Data Matrix 
Population 
Joint ~tirnulus 
Individual Stimtflus Individual Stimulus 
FIGURE 3 FIGURE 4 
A Data Matrix A Data Matrix 
points, the analysis yields the order of these points on a psychological a t t r i -  
bute or the location of these points in a multidimensional space; the indi- 
viduals who made the judgments or responses are not  located as points in the  
space. So we might call such a space a Stimulus space. Correspondingly, 
we can talk about  a space in which only individuals are located as a Popu- 
lation space, and a space with both stimuli and people as a Joint space. We 
have the kinds of spaces in which psychological da ta  are analyzed class- 
ified in Figure 4. 
We now have the beginning of what  I call the Scale Grid. We could 
move in either of two directions: developing the model and putt ing a li t t le 
more meat  on the skeleton, or constructing a psychological interpreta-  
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t ion in order to bring out the implications of the grid. I find it rather diffi- 
cult not  to do both as they are so closely interdependent. So I shall first de- 
velop some of the theoretical ideas which will be most related to the inter- 
pretations which will follow. We shall consider some typical experiments 
which are mapped into Joint  spaces and some which are mapped into Stimulus 
spaces; then we shall see what the difference is between them. The char- 
acterization of this difference will constitute one dimension of the Scale Grid. 
Model Underlying The Scale Grid. 
Behavior on a mental test is interpreted as a relation on a pair of points, 
one of which is associated with the individual and the other associated with 
the i tem or stimulus. Such behavior is mapped  into data  which, when ana- 
lyzed, yields a Joint  space with both stimuli and individuals located in it. 
What  is the primitive operation here? The test  i tem was conceived of as 
having a certain difficulty and the individual was, in effect, asked to compare 
his ability level with the difficulty level of the item. In a psychophysical 
s tudy of the thresholds of individuals, the same is true, e.g., the individual 
is asked whether he perceives the stimulus, yes or no, and the behavior 
is interpreted as a relation on a pair of points, one of which is associated 
with the threshold of the individual, the other with a stimulus magnitude. 
On the other hand, in a psychological s tudy designed to measure heav- 
iness of weights, length of fines, brightness of fights, or what have you, 
what  is the primitive operation? The  stimuli are conceived of as points on 
an at tr ibute continuum, and the individual is asked which of the stimuli 
is greater. The behavior is interpreted as data on pairs of points both of 
which are associated with stimuli. Analysis of the data locates the stimuli 
on a scale, but  no a t tempt  is made to locate the individual as a point on 
the scale. The result is a Stimulus space. 
Suppose I have some at t i tude statements about  the church. I want 
to scale the items and then measure people's att i tudes with them. The first 
step is to  scale the items, so we ask individuals to evaluate the items as to 
which is more pro-church. A data matrix is constructed which is analyzed 
to yield a Stimulus space, say a one-dimensional scale, with the items located 
as points on a continuum. We note tha t  the individuals were asked to eval- 
uate the items with respect to where the items were on the continuum and 
not with respect to any point on this continuum which corresponded to 
the individual. Having scaled the items, we turn around and ask the indi- 
vidual which items he indorses. When we analyze these data, we end up 
with the individuals located on the same continuum, because this t ime 
the experimenter gave the individuals a different task to perform. The indi- 
viduals were each asked to evaluate the items with respect to  some point on 
the continuum corresponding to his own at t i tude toward the church, so 
now we are in a Joint  space. 
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I could go on with examples from conditioning experiments or studies 
in perception, etc., but will not take the time for it. The important thing 
is to see the essential difference between behavior which is mapped into a 
Joint space and behavior which is mapped into a Stimulus space. In all 
the experiments, there are always both individuals and stimuli--what is it 
that determines whether an experimenter maps his experiment into a Sti- 
mulus space or into a Joint space? 
If you go back and look at experiments with this question in mind, it 
becomes obvious that the experimenter: puts his experment in a Joint space 
o1" a Stimulus space according to whether he regards the individual as having 
e~atuated the stimuli with respect to a point corresponding to himself, the 
individual, or whether the individual evaluated the stimuli with respect to 
an attribute. I have called these two kinds of tasks, task A and task B, re- 
spectively. Task A may be described as evaluative, having to do with the 
relation of stimuli to the individual himself. Task B may be described as 
substantive, having to do with the nature of the stimuli per se. 
I formalized this distinction between task A and task B in the following 
manner. In all experiments, both the individuals and the stimuli are points 
in a space, but in task A the points associated with the individuals are inde- 
pendent of the points associated with the stimuli. Whereas in task B, where 
the individual is evaluating stimuli with respect to an attribute, the point 
associated with an individual is completely dependent upon the points as- 
sociated with the stimuli he is evaluating. I will not try to go further with 
this now, but essentially what we have is one dimension of the Scale Grid 
with just its two extremes represented--complete independence of the indi- 
vidual's point from those of the stimuli and complete dependence of his 
point on those of the stimuli, corresponding to task A and task B, respec- 
tively. 
I have taken a good deal of time just to give an intuitive notion of one 
dimension of the Scale Grid. Let me briefly say lust u few words about a 
second dimension. We can ask exactly the same questions about the differ- 
ence between a Joint space and a Population space; we would find an equi- 
valent answer if we just reverse the roles of stimuli and individuals in the 
argument and analysis just made. The reasoning is not difficult but is too 
detailed for an address. Let me merely state the conclusions. In a Joint 
space the points associated with the stimuli are completely independent of 
the points associated with the individual, whereas in a Population space 
the points associated with the stimuli are completely dependent on the 
points of the individuals responding to them. There is a duality between 
Stimulus spaces and Population spaces: in Stimulus spaces the points asso- 
ciated with individuals are dependent upon the points associated with the 
stimuli judged, whereas the reverse holds for Population spaces. 
We have here two of the dimensions of tile Scale Grid. I have constructed 
C L Y D E  H .  C O O M B S  3 1 9  
two others which can be used to characterize the data within these major areas 
of Joint spaces, Stimulus spaces, and Population spaces; but I will say nothing 
further about them here as they are not relevant to the interpretations I wish 
to bring out. I will only say that something of their nature is described in my 
early monograph on theory of psychological scaling (2). 
If we take the two dimensions which we already have, they suggest a 
fourth type of space, called a Field space, in which the points associated with 
stimuli and those associated with individuals are completely mutually depend- 





Task A Task B 
FIGURE 5 
The Scale Grid 
Some questions naturally arise as to just what might be the significance 
of all of this and just what this Field space type of behavior is. While we know 
what goes into a Stimulus, Population, or Joint space, this Field space was a 
consequence of our analysis of the others, and it is not immediately obvious 
what significance it has. In order to answer this question, I shall suggest a 
psychological interpretation of the Scale Grid. 
Psychological Interpretation of the Scale Grid 
I shall first point out what I consider to be the psychological processes 
involved in collecting data in a Stimulus space. Then by virtue of the duality 
between stimuli and individuals, a dual interpretation for Population spaces 
will be made and certain implications of duality pointed out. From these two 
kinds of spaces we shall move in one direction and get Joint spaces and in the 
other direction to get Field spaces. 
Consider what is involved when we collect data in a Stimulus space. An 
individual, the subject, is asked to make judgments about stimuli with respect 
to an attribute (task B). He is given a set of weights and asked about their 
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felt-heaviness, a set of tones and asked about their pitch or loudness, etc. The 
objects of judgment in this situation have many measures; each object has a 
measure on each of its many attributes c.g., color, size, heaviness, form, 
volume, aesthetic quality, etc. 
So we have stimuli corresponding to points having several components, 
and individuals instructed to select one of these components and evaluate the 
stimuli with respect to that attribute. Let me say it again and contrast the 
difference--the stimuli are points on many attributes, the individual comes 
with an attribute in mind but no scale position of his own from which to 
evaluate the stimuli. In an exaggerated sense, for a Stimulus space the stimuli 
have provided the points, and the individual has provided the attribute. These 
then are the respective functions of stimuli and individuals in generating data 
in a Stimulus space. The behavior observed is ultimately converted to measures 
of the stimuli on the attribute. The behavior observed may run the gamut of 
paired comparisons, rating scales, or free-answer protocols--these differences 
are not relevant here. The important thing is that the behavior observed is 
interpreted as da ta  which are relations on the stimuli with respect to the 
attribute. The analysis then leads to measures of the s~imuli only. 
Let us now exercise the duality relation and consider what the process 
must be for a Population space. When we reverse the roles of stimuli and 
people we must have a group of individuals, each possessing measures on many 
attributes just as the stimuli had in a Stimulus space. An individual thus 
corresponds to a point with many components. Then we must have stimuli 
which, carrying through the analogy, must be instructed to select one of these 
components and evaluate the individuals with respect to that attribute. In 
the Population space the individuals provide the points, and the stimulus 
provides the attribute. These then are the respective functions of stimuli and 
individuals in a Population space. What kinds of behavior do psychologists 
observe in which these are the respective functions of the stimuli and the 
subjects? I would say that certain questionnaires, certain interest and neu- 
rotic inventories, and essay examinations represent the kinds of behavior 
that are typically mapped into Population spaces. There is a variety of possible 
methods of observing such behavior, but, speaking category-wise, the most 
typical are rating scales and free-answer protocols. 
The rating scale method is the questionnaire item with a number of 
ordered a l t e rna t ives~n  example from a questionnaire used on soldiers during 
the war is the following: 
Do you ever get so blue and discouraged that you wonder whether 
anything is worth while? 
a) Hardly ever 
b) Not so often 
c) Pretty often 
d) Very often 
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Such a procedure is formally equivalent to asking an individual to judge 
weights as being light, medium, or heavy. But one experiment is in a Popula- 
tion space, the other in a Stimulus space. 
Free-answer protocols are illustrated by the essay examination, the open- 
ended questionnaire, and the interview. The individual is asked a question 
which in principle specifies an attribute, e.g., How do you feel about the farm 
policy? The individuals who are asked this question are playing the role of 
stimuli being evaluated with respect to an attribute. The protocols which 
emerge are analyzed for relations between the individuals, which constitute 
measures of them on this attribute. This is formally equivalent to the use of 
individual's evaluations of stimuli with respect to an attribute, which leads 
to information about where the stimuli are on the attribute selected by the 
individual. 
One immediate consequence of this duality between Stimulus spaces 
and Population spaces is that any method for collecting or analyzing data 
constructed for either one of these spaces immediately becomes a potential 
method for collecting or analyzing data for the other. Thus we have, for ex- 
ample, Thurstone's Law of Comparative Judgment constructed for analyzing 
the judgment of individuals about stimuli and arriving at a Stimulus scale. 
Immediately there is implied the dual method of having stimuli make paired 
comparison judgments about individuals--as yet I have seen no good way of 
getting stimuli to do this. However, there are variations of this basic method of 
Thurstone's: the Method of Successive Intervals and the Method of Equal 
Appearing Intervals are used for constructing Stimulus spaces which do 
transfer completely to Population spaces. To transfer the Method of Succes- 
sive Intervals to Population spaces you need to have stimuli sort people into 
piles. I suggest this is exactly what is done by those questionnaire items with 
multiple alternatives, e.g., from strongly agree to strongly disagree. Abstractly, 
we can look upon such behavior as stimuli sorting individuals into piles. In 
the Method of Successive Intervals the instructions to the subject are dual- 
istically equivalent to the writing and editing of an item for a questionnaire 
or essay examination. I find it strikingly curious that we frequently tend to use 
five degrees of indorsement or five ordered steps in the alternatives, whereas in 
the Method of Successive Intervals we have individuals sort items into as 
many as eleven piles. Whether there is a profound reason behind this, or 
whether it is unjustified adherence to tradition, I am not sure. 
Just as Thurstone's methods for Stimulus scales are transferable to 
Population spaces, so also are methods designed for the analysis of data in 
Population spaces alternative methods for Stimulus spaces, e.g., Lazarsfeld's 
methods of latent structure analysis could be used for scaling stimuli in 
Stimulus spaces by reversing the subscripts which identify stimuli and indi- 
viduals, and obtaining the appropriate kind of judgments from individuals. 
We see here, in fact, the relation of certain methodologies of the psycho- 
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physicist studying Stimulus spaces to those of the social psychologist studying 
Population spaces. What the first makes people do to the stimuli, the latter 
makes stimuli do to people. Their methods of doing research, collecting, and 
analyzing data are formally isomorphic with the roles of stimuli and people 
reversed. Surely, with reference to methodology, whatever one develops sug- 
gests a dual development for the other. Each delineates an attribute on which 
the objects of judgment are to be evaluated. In psychophysics the experimenter 
does this through his instructions to the subject; in questionnaires and essay 
examinations the experimenter does it through his careful writing of items. 
All the various experimental controls developed in one context, again, in 
principle, transfer to the other context with the reversal of roles between 
stimuli and people. 
The greater status in measurement of psychophysics is due, at least in 
part, to the fact that an individual can compare two stimuli directly, whereas 
a stimulus cannot compare two individuals directly. We are much happier 
with the judgment of an individual as to which of two attitude statements he 
prefers to indorse than we are with the judgment of which of two individuals 
indorses a given statement more strongly. The reason for this is very simple. 
When we ask an individual which of two stimuli he prefers, we assume he has 
an implicit standard of measurement that is an ordered scale applicable to 
both stimuli. If we wish to compare two individuals as to which indorses a 
stimulus more strongly, we have to assume not only that they each have an 
implicit interval scale but also that the scales have the same origin and the 
same unit of measurement. Thus, if individual A says he would pay $10 for a 
picture and individual B $5, how do we know but that A has less value for 
money than B? Once we have made the assumption of an interpersonally 
comparable interval scale, there is no sense in reducing the data to a paired 
comparison--that would be throwing away information already assumed. 
This argument can be summed up by saying that the implicit standards of 
judgment of one person are presumably more stable over the two stimuli than 
the standards of two people over one stimulus. This might well be the con- 
sideration that underlies using fewer alternatives for an item in a question- 
naire than the number of piles used in the Method of Successive Intervals. 
When one looks at the differences between areas in this context one 
finds no justification for quarrels nor for differences in respectability. One 
area can use a system just as logically precise as the other, but the basic 
data observed in one area may be a weaker relation than is observed in the 
other area. 
With Stimulus and Population spaces mutually described and related 
we turn briefly to Joint spaces. Here both stimuli and individuals come 
together, jointly specifying what the attributes will be; both have their 
own measures on these attributes. For example, consider an individual 
working an arithmetic problem. The arithmetic problem is represented by 
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a point with measures on one or more components. The individual is similarly 
represented by a point with measures on these components. The response 
of the individual to the stimulus will be information about the relation of 
these two points in the Joint space. 
By defining what this information is in different ways, one gets Guttman 
scalogram theory, test theory, one of Lazarsfeld's models, or my unfolding 
technique for the analysis of preferences. All of these are just different models 
for what a response on the phenotypie level means in terms of distances 
between pairs of points in the Joint genotypic space. [The relation of these 
various spaces to the classification of methodologies contained in (3) should 
be pointed out. The methods of collecting data which apply to Joint spaces 
are classified in Quadrants I and II, and the methods which apply in Stimulus 
spaces or in Population spaces are classified in Quadrants III  and IV.] 
In Joint spaces all the psychophysical methods for analyzing experiments 
concerned with thresholds, as distinct from those concerned with measuring 
only the stimulus magnitudes, are present. The individual in such experiments 
is regarded as having a threshold on an attribute, such as his sensitivity to 
light or his ability to discriminate pitch. This characteristic of the individual 
corresponds to a point in the genotypic space, which we have called his ideal 
on that attribute. The stimulus then is an increment of light or a difference 
between two tones, and the individual is asked whether he observes it. The 
stimulus is then also represented by a point in the space. The response of 
the individual is a formal relation on the pair of points in exactly the same 
manner as passing or failing an arithmetic item. 
The data obtained from neurotic inventories and interest inventories 
are typically mapped into Joint spaces. For example, an individual is asked 
a question like "Are you shy?" which he is to answer yes or no. The individual 
is presumed to prossess and recognize his particular amount of shyness-- 
this corresponds to a point in the genotypic space, which is his ideal. The 
question "Are you shy?" with the alternatives yes or no also corresponds to 
a point in the genotypic space which is that amount of shyness the individual 
feels he should have to say yes. This amount of shyness is formally equivalent 
to the difficulty of an arithmetic problem, the increment of light, or the 
difference between two tones in the preceding examples. Again the individual's 
response to the question is interpreted as a relation between the respective 
points. 
That the data obtained from individual's indorsements or preferences 
between attitude statements may also be mapped into Joint spaces is too 
obvious to need further description. Most learning experiments are mapped 
into Joint spaces. A conditioning experiment, for example, is like an objective 
test given backwards: a combination of unconditioned stimulus and con- 
ditioning stimulus may be thought of as an item, and eliciting a conditioned 
response is equivalent to passing an item. Then the most difficult item in 
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the test is presented first, i.e., the first presentation of conditioning stimulus 
and unconditioned stimulus, and the individual usually fails it. As learning 
takes place each successive presentation is essentially an easier item until 
items are so easy that the individual passes them all. I t  is interesting to note 
that the conditioning test has a different method of scoring from the objective 
mental test, e.g., the number of items taken to reach a certain number of 
items passed successively. One wonders why most objective tests should 
have a different convention. I do not object to different conventions, I just 
like to know what the logic behind them is. 
So we have all these superficially different kinds of behavior: objective 
tests, certain psychophysical experiments, neurotic inventories, interest 
questionnaries, attitude scale studies, and conditioning experiments. All 
tend to develop their own methodologies and their own vocabulary--but 
all are formally isomorphic and hence their methodologies transferable from 
one to the other. A model for analysis of one of these kinds of data with a 
particular distance function, for example, immediately raises the question 
whether it does not also constitute a theory about each of the other seemingly 
different kinds of behavior. There are, of course, differences in the character- 
istics of the data one gets in these areas. In some areas experimentally in- 
dependent replication is possible, in others not; in some areas the stability 
of a point associated with an individual or with a stimulus is greater or less 
than in other areas. But fundamentally these differences are quantitative, 
not qualitative, and the methodological contributions to any one area are in 
principle transferable to all the others. 
Before going on to a psychological interpretation of Field spaces, I 
should digress for a moment and clear up a possible source of confusion. I 
have covered Stimulus, Population, and Joint spaces using repeated illus- 
trations. There is a danger of certain misconceptions arising from the illus- 
trations, which we must try to avoid. When I have illustrated one of these 
spaces, I have tried to follow the most conventional ways of analyzing such 
behavior, but the implication should not be drawn that the theory says there 
is only one kind of quantitative data or only one space into which any par- 
ticular behavior can be mapped. 
The act of a psychologist in putting his experimental data into one of 
these spaces (Joint, Stimulus, or Population) represents an optional decision 
on his part. The sense in which these decisions are optional is what I now 
want to make clear. The same behavior may be put into more than one of 
the spaces, thus reflecting different points of view or problems in the mind 
of the experimenter. The distinction between behavior and data, which was 
made earlier, is the relevant principle here. It is sometimes easy to see how 
the same behavior may be interpreted separately as two different kinds of 
data and consequently be put into different spaces. We have become so 
accustomed to certain conventions in the converting of manifest behavior 
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into data  tha t  we sometimes neglect any mapping but  the conventional one. 
While data  is obtained from behavior by  interpreting the behavior as a relation 
between points, i t  is up to  the interpreter to decide what  to identify as 
points and to define the properties of the relation. 
Consider a s tudy on nationality weferences. Let  each subject make 
paired comparison judgments as to which nationality he prefers. In  
Thurstone's  well-known study (5) such data  were analyzed by the Law of 
Comparative Judgment and a scale obtained with the stimuli ranging on a 
one-dimensional continuum from most preferred to least preferred by the 
group as a whole. When the experimenter does this, he is regarding "pref- 
erabili ty" as an at tr ibute of stimuli and is saying that  the individuals made 
task B judgments, substantive iudgments, about the stimuli. The behavior 
is interpreted as an order relation on pairs of points, both of which are stimuli. 
He is saying the behavior belongs in a Stimulus space, and proceeds to con- 
struct  a stimulus scale. 
On the other hand, one could take the identical experiment and put  it 
in a Joint space. In doing this, one would be assuming that  the individuals 
were also points in the space and that  their behavior is to be interpreted as 
an order relation on distances of the stimuli's points from the individual's 
point. Thus, the behavior is being put  into a Joint space instead of a Stimulus 
space, and analysis of the data by multidimensional unfolding would yield 
a solution with both stimuli and individuals in the space. 
There is nothing intrinsically correct about  one of these procedures 
or wrong about  the other. In the first instance, analyzing the data in a 
Stimulus space, one's problem is essentially tha t  of amalgamating the prefer- 
ences of individuals to arrive at  a single preference scale, which in some 
sense best represents all the individuals. This is the problem of social utility 
or social choice. In  the second instance, analyzing the data  in a Joint  space, 
one's problem is tha t  of discovering the latent attr ibutes underlying national- 
i ty  preferences from which an individual's preferences could be derived. I t  
might be parenthetically remarked tha t  these two solutions would bear a 
certain interesting relation to each other, this relation has been developed 
in two previous publications (2, 4). 
Here we have taken an example of behavior and made the transition 
into two different kinds of data, analysis of which yields different results. 
We usually overlook this step that  we take between behavior and data 
because this step, at  least in some areas of research, is so conventional and 
immediate. Everyone can usually agree on what is or is not the right answer 
to an arithmetic problem; when an individual says this weight is heavier 
than that  one, everyone usually agrees he means this weight is higher on an  
at t r ibute of felt-heaviness than that  one. But  when we have an individual's 
answer to an essay examination question or his answer to an open-endecl 
questionnaire item, we speak of "coding" them. This is the process of con- 
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verting the behavior to data by processing it through the mind of another 
person to get statements of magnitude or relations--these data are what are 
analyzed. It  is important to note that what one analyzes is always data, 
not behavior. 
This distinction between behavior and data now becomes an even more 
important and relevant distinction as we turn to a psychological interpretation 
of Field spaces. To arrive at this interpretation we move along two dimensions 
of the Scale Grid simultaneously. In going from Joint to Stimulus spaces, 
the point associated with the individual became dependent on the stimuli 
being judged. There ceased to be a unique point characterizing the individual. 
Another way of looking at it is that the stimulus ceased to define the attribute 
with respect to which the judgments were made. In passing from Joint to 
Population spaces, the point associated with a stimulus became dependent 
on the individuals being judged. There ceased to be a unique point character- 
izing the stimulus. Another way of looking at this is that the individual ceased 
to define the attribute with respect to which the judgments were made. 
In Joint spaces both stimuli and individuals are points and jointly 
define the attribute. In Stimulus spaces the stimuli are independent points, 
and the individuals are instructed to define the attribute. In Population 
spaces the individuals are independent points and the stimuli are instructed 
to define the attribute. Putting these together for Field spaces, we have the 
points for stimuli and individuals mutually dependent with neither instructed 
to define an attribute. 
If you wanted to observe such behavior what would you do? You would 
present an individual with a stimulus that was of such an ambiguous nature 
it would not arouse any common attribute space in individuals. At the same 
time the individual would be totally uninstructed to respond with respect 
to any particular attribute space. This is my definition of what would be a 
perfect projective test situation. The behavior that is observed is associated 
with a point in a psychological space with which both the individual and 
the stimulus are identified. 
I t  is to be noted that in all the other types of spaces (Joint, Stimulus, 
and Population) the attribute space is at least implicitly defined by the 
stimuli and/or by the instructions to the subject. Consider all the care given 
to selecting and wording items properly so that they will ask exactly the 
right question. This is nothing more than trying to limit the attribute sp~ce 
generating behavior. Exactly the same objective underlies the care in the 
communication of instructions to the observer in a psychophysical experiment. 
This care is taken to insure that he will ask the same question of every 
stimulus. I t  is then assumed that these precautions have succeeded, and the 
behavior is interpreted as flfformation about a pair of points, or the distance 
between them, or a pair of distances. This mapping, done by definition, is 
what translates behavior into data. 
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In  a Stimulus space, the individual was instructed to ask of the stimulus 
how heavy  it was, or how esthetically pleasing it  was, etc. An a t t r ibute  
was explicit,, and so the behavior  could be interpreted as magnitudes on an 
a t t r ibute  and thus made into data.  Analysis of such da ta  leads to conclusions 
about  interstimulus differences. In  u Populat ion space the roles are reversed: 
a stimulus comes to the individual and asks him how he feels about  the fa rm 
policy. Again an a t t r ibute  is explicit. The  behavior  is interpreted as magni- 
tudes on an at tr ibute,  analysis of which leads to conclusions about  inter- 
individual differences. 
In  a Joint space both  interpretat ions are possible because the behavior 
is interpreted as data  on a relation between individuals and stimuli. In  a 
Field space the point associated with the individual has merged with the point 
associated with the stimulus. The behavior is information about  this point 
in a psychological space, a point in which the subject and the stimulus are 
inextricably identified. 
The care given in Population spaces to selecting items for a questionnaire 
or essay examination in order to ask every individual the same question, and 
the care given in Stimulus spaces to phrasing instructions to the subject in 
order tha t  he evaluate all the stimuli on the same at t r ibute  is now exercised 
in Field spaces so tha t  precisely these effects will not occur. Every  effort is 
made to insure a setting in which the stimulus will not suggest a part icular  
a t t r ibute  space, and every effort is made in the instructions to the subject 
not to suggest a particular a t t r ibute  space. Herein lies both  the s trength and 
weakness of Field spaces. The protocol tha t  emerges now constitutes a 
stimulus to be eva lua ted- - so  it  is a stimulus to be located in u Stimulus 
space. In  order to convert  this protocol, this behavior, into da ta  certain 
problems need to be solved. One is: what  is the a t t r ibute  or at t r ibutes  which 
underlie the behavior? This is a new problem which had not previously 
arisen for any  of the other spaces. Here now we have a protocol which is to 
be converted into a measure on some attr ibutes.  The  first problem is: which 
at t r ibutes? This problem arises because there was not deliberately built  into 
the stimulus nor into the individual constraints or instructions which would 
provide a simple answer. 
I t  is immediately obvious t ha t  behavior  in this area does not  lend to 
interindividual comparisons, because there has been no instruction to the 
stimulus, no built-in device by  vir tue of which it can be assumed tha t  a 
stimulus has evaluated each individual on the same attr ibute.  If one person 
exhibits guilt feelings and another does not, one cannot conclude the lat ter  
person has less guilt feelings unless one can assume the stimulus was such 
as to make every individual reveal his guilt feelings. In  this case, of course, 
such data  could be put  back in Populat ion spaces, and interindividual com- 
parisons would be possible. 
I t  may  help one to recognize and understand this problem if we point 
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out tha t  it  is like having the answer of an individual to an essay examination 
question when you do not know what the question was. Consider, then, 
having the answers of several individuals, each to an unknown question; 
the problem is to decide which individual's answer represents more of some- 
ing than another's. I t  seems to me the problem is meaningless if the question 
answered by an individual has been left up to him to select, hence each 
individual has perhaps selected a different question. One could say, well I 
can evaluate their relative eommund of English, or their vocabulary level, 
or their handwriting if it is u writ ten protocol. This is entirely correct, of 
course, and amounts to saying this is the common at t r ibute which the 
stimulus aroused in all individuals, hence they may legitimately be compared. 
This puts the behavior into a Population space, not a Field space. What  I 
am talking about are those aspects of the behavior which are not a t t r ibute  
controlled and hence belong in u Field space. 
Understandably enough, there have been instruments constructed, 
called projective instruments, which seek to avoid this particular problem. 
For instanee, there are test  instruments in which a picture suggests an 
at tr ibute;  the individual is asked to wi~te a story which is presumed to 
reveal where he is on tha t  attribute.  Examples are Proshansky's  Labor TAT,  
Johnson's Anglo-Spanish TAT,  and toy  play with negro and white dolls. 
If these instruments succeed in their purpose, then we have the stimulus 
coming to the individual with an at tr ibute in mind and asking the individual 
where he is on it. These instruments then, if successful, are formally the 
same thing as a rather subtle essay examination or an interview by a laborer, 
a Mexican, or a Negro. The data  tha t  are obtained pertain to a Population 
space rather than a Field space, and interindividual comparisons are logically 
permissible. Such instruments, however, are not  projective instruments 
in the sense of belonging in Field spaces. A further question then arises 
as to whether or not these instruments accomplish their purpose. If they 
fail to arouse the at t r ibute which the experimenter subtly built into the 
stimulus then there is serious danger of drawing false conclusions. 
Let  us assume tha t  the first problem is solved or can be so lved- - tha t  
we can look at  the protocol and say what  the attr ibutes are which underlie 
the behavior. Then a second problem arises, which is the most fascinating 
and perhaps the most important  of all: what  does it  mean tha t  the individual 
selected these particular attr ibutes to exhibit out of all of those possible in 
his repertoire? I think that  no solution yet  exists, but  ult imately this problem 
must be answered in order to interpret  projective instruments. This problem 
lies in the urea of the psychology of the individual. Because the at tr ibutes 
were left up to the individual, their selection is a reflection of his internal 
dynamics. Because each individual is answering different questions, the 
behavior cannot be taken to reflect interindividual comparisons on a common 
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attribute. On the contrary, and therein lies both its importance to psychology 
and its weakness as data, the behavior reflects intra-individual comparisons. 
A protocol in a Field space reflects a point in a psychological space. 
When we know enough to interpret the protocol as a measure of tha t  point, 
in a known attribute space, then we shall be able to make comparisons between 
the points. I suspect tha t  these will be comparisons on some hyperabstraet  
attributes which will reflect intra-individual dynamics. The problems which 
must be solved to reach this stage are what I would regard as our ultimate 
measurement problems. Field spaces are a maximally significant domain of 
behavior. I t  is the urea that  reflects intra-individual differences to a degree 
that  no other area does. There are fascinating and important  problems for 
psychologists here. I t  is my thought and hope that, the Scale Grid will help 
to delineate more dearly the basic measurement problems involved. 
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